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If we apply an extension of the Deduction meta-Theorem to Gödel’s meta-reasoning of 
“undecidability”, we can conclude that Gödel’s formal system of Arithmetic is not 
omega-consistent. If we then interpret [(Ax)F(x)] as “There is a general, x-
independent, routine to establish that F(x) holds for all x”, instead of as “F(x) holds 
for all x”, it follows that a constructively interpreted omega-inconsistent system proves 
Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem negatively.  
1.1 Notation 
We generally follow the notation of Gödel [Go31a]. However, we use the notation 
“(Ax)”, which classically interprets as “for all x”, to denote Gödel’s special symbolism 
for Generalisation.  
We use square brackets to indicate that the expression (including square brackets) only 
denotes the string1 named within the brackets. Thus, “[(Ax)]” is not part of the formal 
system P, and would be replaced by Gödel’s special symbolism for Generalisation in 
order to obtain the actual string in which it occurs. 
Following Gödel’s definitions of well-formed formulas2, we note that juxtaposing the 
string “[(Ax)]” and the formula3 “[F(x)]” is the formula “[(Ax)F(x)]”, juxtaposing the 
                                                        
1 We define a “string” as any concatenation of a finite set of the primitive symbols of the formal system 
under consideration. 
 
2 We note that all “well-formed formulas” of P are “strings” of P, but all “strings” of P are not “well-
formed formulas” of P. 
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symbol “[~]” and the formula “[F]” is the formula “[~F]”, and juxtaposing the symbol 
“[v]” between the formulas “[F]” and “[G]” is the formula “[FvG]”. 
The numerical functions and relations in the following are defined explicitly by Gödel 
[Go31a]. The formulas are defined implicitly by his reasoning.  
1.2 Definitions 
We take P to be Gödel’s formal system, and define ([Go31a], Theorem VI, p24-25): 
(i)     Q(x, y) as Gödel’s recursive numerical relation ~xB(Sb(y 19|Z(y))). 
(ii)    [R(x, y)] as a formula that represents Q(x, y) in the formal system P. 
(The existence of such a formula follows from Gödel’s Theorem VII [Go31a].) 
(iii)   q as the Gödel-number of the formula [R(x, y)] of P. 
(iv)   p as the Gödel-number of the formula [(Ax)][R(x, y)]4 of P. 
(v)    [p] as the numeral that represents the natural number p in P. 
(vi)   r as the Gödel-number of the formula [R(x, p)] of P. 
(vii)  17Genr as the Gödel-number of the formula [(Ax)R(x, p)] of P. 
(viii) Neg(17Genr) as the Gödel-number of the formula [~(Ax)R(x, p)] of P. 
                                                                                                                                                                   
 
3 By “formula”, we shall mean a “well-formed formula” as defined by Gödel. 
 
4 We note that "[(Ax)][R(x, y)]" and "[(Ax)R(x, y)]" denote the same formula of P. 
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(ix)   R(x, y) as the arithmetical interpretation of the formula [R(x, y)] of P. 
(R(x, y) is defined by Gödel’s Theorem VII [Go31a], where it is proved 
instantiationally equivalent to Q(x, y).) 
1.3 Gödel’s Lemmas 
In the proof of his Theorem VI, Gödel [Go31a] proves the following lemmas: 
Lemma 1: ~xB(17Genr) => Bew(Sb(r 17|Z(x))) 
Lemma 2: xB(17Genr) => Bew(Neg Sb(r 17|Z(x))) 
1.4 Gödel’s meta-Lemmas 
He then proves the following meta-lemmas: 
Meta-lemma 1: Bew(17Genr) => Bew(Neg Sb(r 17|Z(n))) holds for some natural 
number n. 
Meta-lemma 2: Bew(17Genr) => ~Bew(17Genr) holds, if P is assumed consistent. 
Meta-Lemma 3: ~nB(17Genr) holds for any natural number n, if P is assumed 
consistent. 
Meta-lemma 4: Bew(Neg(17Genr)) => ~Bew(Neg(17Genr)) holds, assuming P is 
omega-consistent. 
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1.5 Gödel’s conclusions and consequences 
From these Gödel concludes that ~Bew(17Genr) holds if P is assumed consistent. Hence 
17Gen is not P-PROVABLE5, and, ipso facto, [(Ax)R(x, p)] is not P-provable, if P is 
assumed consistent. 
He also concludes that ~Bew(Neg(17Genr)) holds if P is assumed omega-consistent. 
Hence Neg(17Genr) is not P-PROVABLE, and, ipso facto, [~(Ax)R(x, p)] is not P-
provable, if P is assumed omega-consistent. 
1.6 P is not omega-consistent 
Meta-Theorem 1:  P is not omega-consistent 
Proof:  Since 17Genr is the Gödel-number of the formula [(Ax)R(x, p)]: 
(i)     If [(Ax)R(x, p)] is P-provable, then nB(17Genr) holds for some natural 
number n.6 
(ii)    Hence, by Lemma 2: 
                                                        
 
5 The web-version [Go31b] of Gödel’s paper uses italics instead of CAPITALS to refer to meta-
mathematical concepts in assertions where the formulas of P are referred to by their Gödel-numbers. 
 
6 In a companion paper [An02], where I review Gödel's and Rosser's non-formal meta-reasoning of 
undecidability, I argue that this “semantic” meta-equivalence is equivalent to the “non-semantic” meta-
assertion: 
 
     [(Ax)R(x, p)] => [Bew(Neg Sb(r 17|Z(n)))] is P-provable for some numeral [n], 
 
where [Bew(Neg Sb(r 17|Z(n)))] is the formula of P whose interpretation is the proposition obtained 
when we substitute a given natural number n for the variable x in the recursive relation Bew(Neg Sb(r 
17|Z(x))). I argue that §1.6(ii) and (iii) can similarly be expressed as “non-semantic” P-provable meta-
assertions. 
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If [(Ax)R(x, p)] is P-provable, then Bew(Neg Sb(r 17|Z(n))) holds for some 
natural number n. 
(iii)   Since Neg Sb(r 17|Z(n)) is the Gödel-number of [~R(n, p)], we have that: 
If Bew(Neg Sb(r 17|Z(n))) holds for some natural number n, then [~R(n, p)] is 
P-provable for some numeral [n]. 
(iv)    We thus have the meta-inferences: 
If [(Ax)R(x, p)] is P-provable, then [~R(n, p)] is P-provable for some numeral 
[n] 
If [(Ax)R(x, p)] is P-provable, then [(Ex)~R(x, p)] is P-provable7 
If [(Ax)R(x, p)] is P-provable, then [~(Ax)R(x, p)] is P-provable 
(v)     We now appeal to an extension of the Deduction Theorem (see Appendix 1), 
and conclude that: 
[(Ax)R(x, p)] => [~(Ax)R(x, p)] is P-provable. 
(vi)    By the logical axioms of P, it follows that: 
[~(Ax)R(x, p)] is P-provable 
(vii)  Hence [(Ax)R(x, p)] is not P-undecidable. 
(viii) Now, from Meta-lemma 3 we have: 
[R(n, p)] is P-provable for some numeral [n]. 
                                                        
 
7 We use “(Ex)” to denote the string “~(Ax)~”. 
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(ix)    It follows from (vi) and (viii) that P is not omega-consistent. 
1.7 Conclusion 
We conclude that, if we admit meta-mathematical arguments of provability, then P is 
not omega-consistent (we note an interesting interpretation of this in Appendix 2). 
Appendix 1: An “extended” Deduction Theorem 
In §1.6(v), we appeal to the following argument for an “extended” interpretation of the 
Deduction Theorem.  
Deduction Theorem: From “If [A] is P-provable, then [B] is P-provable” we may 
conclude “([A] => [B]) is P-provable”, where [A], [B] are propositions in P. 
Proof: The meta-deduction “If [A] is P-provable, then [B] is P-provable”, where [A], [B] 
are propositions in P, implies that there is some finite sequence of P-formulas, [B1], 
[B2],..., [Bn], such that [B1] is [A], and each |Bi] is (1) either [A], or (2) an axiom of P, or 
(3) an immediate consequence of some formulas in the set consisting of [A], the axioms 
of P, and the preceding [Bi]s. Using induction on “i”, we may thus conclude that ([A] => 
[B]) is P-provable by the usual reasoning ([Me64], p61, proposition 2.4). 
We highlight the distinction, since it can be argued that the proof of the standard 
Deduction Theorem requires that, in order to conclude that ([A] => [B]) is P-provable, 
the sequence [B1], [B2],..., [Bn] must be explicitly expressed, and not simply assumed as 
implicitly expressible. 
Now, by Gödel’s reasoning, Bew(n) may hold for a class D of natural numbers even 
when an explicit PROOF for each n in the class is not known. In other words, we may 
have no known general method for constructively determining the PROOF of any given 
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n of D. This simply reflects the existential nature of Gödel’s definition Bew(x) <=> 
(Ey)yBx.  
Hence, an extended interpretation of the Deduction Theorem becomes necessary, unless 
we deny validity to meta-mathematical reasoning for establishing that a formula, or a 
class of formulas, of P is provable. However, this would then deny validity to Gödel’s 
meta-mathematical Lemmas, from which he concludes his Theorem VI.  
Appeal to an extended Deduction Theorem is also explicit in Mendelson’s version 
([Me64], p146, proposition 3.32) of Rosser’s argument8 for the construction of 
undecidable propositions in a consistent P. 
Appendix 2: A constructive interpretation of “(Ax)F(x)” and a solution to Hilbert’s 
Entscheidungsproblem for P 
The omega-inconsistency of P has an interesting, constructive, interpretation that yields a 
negative proof of Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem for P.  
The classical Platonist interpretation 
It follows from §1.6(viii) that the interpretation R(n, p) of [R(n, p)] holds for any 
natural number n. It follows from §1.6(vi) that the interpretation ~(Ax)R(x, p) of 
[~(Ax)R(x, p)] also holds. If we ignore intuitionist objections, and interpret the latter as 
the Platonist meta-assertion: 
There is some natural number n for which R(n, p) does not hold,  
                                                        
 
8 However, Mendelson’s version appears to apply the extended Deduction Theorem invalidly. Assuming 
that r is a PROOF of a given FORMULA n, it seems to make the invalid assumption, “[r]=<x is P-
provable”, as the premise in the application of the extended Deduction Theorem.  
 
(We use the notation “=<” to to denote the symbol that interprets as “equal to or less than”.) 
 8
Then Meta-theorem 1 has the uncomfortable consequence that the standard 
interpretation of P is inconsistent. 
A constructive interpretation of Generalisation 
However, we can also consider the constructive, and intuitionistically unobjectionable, 
interpretation (Ax)F(x) as the meta-assertion: 
There is a general, x-independent, routine to establish that F(x) holds for all x. 
In other words, we take the standard interpretation of [(Ax)F(x)] as the assertion that 
we can always construct a Turing machine T, independent of n, which can decide that 
F(n) holds for any given natural number n. 
We note that Generalisation ([Me64], p57) would then interpret as a constructive, and 
intuitionistically unobjectionable, Rule of Inference. 
Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem  
So, if we interpret P constructively, we would conclude from §1.6(vi) and §1.6(viii) that 
whereas, given any natural number n, we can always find some n-dependent method to 
establish that R(n, p) holds, we cannot find a general n-independent method to establish 
that R(n, p) holds for any, or all n.  
In other words, given any natural number n, we can always construct a Turing machine 
T(n), that depends on n, which will decide whether the interpretation R(n, p) of [R(n, 
p)] holds or not. However, we cannot construct a Turing machine T that is independent 
of n, and which will decide, for any given n as input, whether R(n, p) holds or not. 
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Thus the omega-inconsistency of P can be seen as a constructive, and intuitionistically 
unobjectionable, negative proof of Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem under a constructive 
standard interpretation for P. 
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